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points in relationship to the number of
instructions in the program." Apple,
714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin defended,
however, that the operating programs
were not copyrightable; first, because
they are embedded on a micro~chip and
are therefore a form of machinery and
second, because they cannot be distin~
guished from the concept of operating
the computer system, they are more
than the mere expression of an idea.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.c. § 102
(1976).
Both of Franklin's arguments were
rejected by the court which reasoned
that the programs do not meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. The
programs are "literary works," and they
are "fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression." Id. at § 102(a). The court
went on to hold that "the medium is not
the message" and the fact that a program
is recorded on a device which is part of
the machinery is a mere change in the
tangible form. Apple, 714 F .2d at 1251.
In response to Franklin's second argu~
ment that an operating system is a mere
method of operation and not protected,
the court relied on Congress's Commis~
sion on New Technological Uses report
which stated "[t]hat the words of a
program are used ultimately in the
implementation of a process should in
no way affect their copyrightability." id.
The court also found that Apple was
seeking only to copyright the instructions
and not the computer operating method.
With the growing number of personal
computers in businesses and private
homes throughout the United States,
this decision protects not only large
computer companies such as Apple, but
also the individual computer operator
who creates hislher own operating
program. ~

by Sylvia Halkousis

LACK OF JURY
IMPARTIALITY REQUIRED
FOR NEW TRIAL

I

n McDonough Power Equipment, Inc.
v. Greenwood, _ U.S. _ (1984),

the United States Supreme Court
clarified the bases upon which a motion
for new trial made as a result of a juror's
failure to disclose information on voir
dire will be granted. To prevail upon
such a motion, a party must show that a
juror's answer to a material question on
voir dire was dishonest and that had the
juror answered honestly, grounds estab~
lishing a challenge for cause would have
been present.
In McDonough Power, Billy Greenwood
and his parents brought suit against
McDonough Power Equipment Incor~
porated to recover damages for injuries
sustained by Billy when his feet came in
contact with the blades of a riding lawn
mower manufactured by McDonough,
Inc. During voir dire, prospective jurors
were asked if they or any of their family
members had ever sustained a severe
injury. One individual, who eventually
became a member of the jury, failed to
respond to this question. After the trial,
the United States District Court entered
judgment upon a jury verdict for
McDonough, Inc.
After entry of the judgment, the
Greenwoods requested and received
permission to approach the jurors in an
attempt to elicit information regarding
injuries sustained by them or members
of their families. Despite discovery of
evidence that a juror had not disclosed
information regarding such injuries, the
district court denied the Greenwood's
motion for a new trial, stating that the
jury verdict was fair and well~supported.
The Greenwoods appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
which reversed the district court judg~
ment. In Greenwood v. McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc., 687 F.2d338 (10th Cir.
1982), the court of appeals held that the
Greenwood's right of per~emptory
challenge had been prejudiced because
of the juror's failure to respond to a
question on voir dire. To cure the error
of the juror's "probable bias," a new
trial was granted. The Supreme Court
however, reversed, holding that a new
trial will not be granted unless a juror's
nondisclosure results in a partial jury.
The court's opinion begins by tracing
the legislative and judicial history of the
harmless error rules. These rules were
adopted to curb the abuses of appellate

review procedures because at one time
"courts of review tower[ ed] above the
trials... as impregnable citadels of
technicality" with trials representing
attempts to get reversible error on the
record. Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 759 (1946). The effect of the
harmless error rules is that courts, in
their judgment, can disregard errors in
the proceeding which do not interfere
with the fairness of the trial.
continued on page 24

RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME

F

or the first time in Maryland, a
trial court has held that expert
testimony on the victim's emo~
tional trauma is admissible in a rape
case to show the victim did not consent
to intercourse. State v. Allewalt, docket
No. 83~CR~2517 (Circuit Court for
Baltimore County November 4, 1983).
Relying on consent as his defense,
Allewalt was convicted of rape after a
psychiatrist described the symptoms
the complainant suffered, and testified
that they were attributable to the
emotional condition known as rape
trauma syndrome.
Rape trauma syndrome is a specific
type of stress disorder which arises
from the emotional impact of being
raped. The symptoms most commonly
associated with rape trauma syndrome
include fear of men in general, fear of
being alone, fear of being raped again,
disturbance in sleep habits, loss of
appetite, depression, and a sense of
shame.
Without the support of expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome,
the defense of consent was often
difficult to disprove because of lack of
physical evidence. Many times the
decision in such a case would be based
solely on the testimony of the com~
plainant and defendant; therefore, the
credibility of each testimony was
critical in the determination of the
outcome. By allowing the expert to
testify, the complainant's testimony
that she did not consent to intercourse
can be corroborated by the testimony
of a psychiatrist. Rape trauma testimony,
therefore, could significantly strengthen
the prosecution's case.
Only a handful of states have directly
decided the issue of admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome. Minnesota, the only
state with more than one decision on
point, has held that the admission of
expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome is reversible error. State v.
Fall, 1984/The Law Forum-ll

Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227,232, (Minn.
1982). The Minnesota courts rely on
two arguments: One, the issue of
consent is within the comprehension of
the jury; therefore, the jury is not helped
by the expert testimony. Two, the
probative value of rape trauma syndrome
is outweighed substantially by the undue
prejudice it places on the defendant.
"Permitting a person in the role of an
expert to suggest that because the
complainant exhibits some of the
symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the
complainant was therefore raped, un,
fairly prejudices the appellant by
creating an aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness." State v. Saldana, 324
N.W.2d 227,230 (Minn. 1982).
In a similar opinion, the Missouri
Supreme Court ruled that expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome is
inadmissible because of its highly
prejudicial nature. State v. Taylor, 661
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1983). "The
jury was competent to determine the
victim's credibility, therefore testimony
designed to invest scientific cachet on
the critical issue (consent) was errone,
ously admitted. Otherwise, trials would
degenerate to a battle of experts
expressing opinion on the substance of
witness veracity," State \!. Taylor, 661
S.W.2d 794 (Mo. App. 1983).
The Supreme Court of Kansas, on the
other hand, held that rape trauma
syndrome is relevant and admissible
when the issue of consent is raised. In
reaching this decision, the court ex,
amined the relevant literature from the
field of psychiatry and found that rape
trauma syndrome is a detectable and
reliable reaction to a forced sexual
assault. The Kansas court has in effect
given judicial approbation to rape
trauma syndrome. State v. Marks, 231
Kan. 645, 647 P.2d 1292 (1982).
In People v. Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr.
726 (App. 1983), the California Court
of Appeals also found rape trauma
syndrome admissible. The court stated
that although expert testimony serves to
reinforce the credibility of the com,
plainant, the purpose behind allowing
such testimony is to impeach the
defendant's testimony regarding con,
sent; therefore, the expert testimony is
admissible to rebut the defense of
consent.
The standard adopted by the Maryland
Court of Appeals for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony is set
out in Frye\!. U.S., 54 U.S. App. D.C. 46
(1923). The court in Frye held that the
first step in determining admissibility is
to show that the expert testimony would
12-The Law Forum/Fall, I984

be of appreciable help to the jury. The
ordinary knowledge of the jury must be
insufficient to competently analyze the
relevant issue before testimony of
persons with skill and expertise in the
area is required.
Once the helpfulness of the expert
testimony is established, the second step
as set out in Frye is to determine whether
the underlying scientific principle relied
on by the expert has been sufficiently
established to h~ve gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific
field. This issue must be addressed and
answered by the court before the
evidence can be admitted.
Although the court in Allewalt did not
state specifically the basis for its holding,
by allowing the expert testimony and
denying the defense's motion for new
trial based on that issue, the trial court in
effect has given judicial approval of rape
trauma syndrome as a means of deciding
the issue of consent. To reach this
conclusion, the court must have decided
that rape trauma syndrome meets the
standard set out in Frye. The defense,
believing that rape trauma syndrome has
not met this standard, has filed an appeal
and plans to petition for certiorari to the
court of appeals.
There are three major arguments
against the general admissibility of rape
trauma syndrome the defense can rely
on for its appeal. First, the trial court
erred in not ruling directly on the issue
of whether rape trauma syndrome has
met the standard set out in Frye. See also
People v. Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr. 727,
733 (App. 1983) (Weiner, A.J., dis,
senting). Second, the symptoms associated
with rape trauma syndrome are common
with those which result from any
number of stressful events; therefore, it
is neither a reliable nor detectable
method to determine the issue of
consent. (Freeman, Kaplan and Sadock,

Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry
1517,25 (3d ed. 1980); American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and

trauma syndrome should not be admitted
into evidence.
The trial court's decision in State v.
Allewalt was a Maryland first, involving
the relatively new legal issue of allowing
expert testimony on the existence of
rape trauma syndrome. By allowing such
testimony, the trial court has provided
an entirely new approach to prosecuting
rape cases where consent is raised as the
defense. Whether this approach will be
available to Maryland prosecutors in the
future will depend on whether the
Allewalt decision survives the judicial
scrutiny of the Maryland Appellate
Courts.
by Cathi Van de Meulebroecke
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Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
236,38 (3d ed. 1980)). See also People v.
Bledsoe, 189 Cal. Rptr. 727, 733 (App.
1983) (Weiner, A.J., dissenting). Third,
the issue of consent is not the type of
complex issue for which the jury needs
the assistance of expert testimony. By
allowing the experts to testify when it is
unnecessary, the province of the jury is
invaded. State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d
227 (Minn. 1982). Generally, the
opponents of rape trauma syndrome feel
the highly prejudicial nature substantially
outweighs any probative value that it
might have; therefore, evidence of rape
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